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The Response to BSE in the United States
By John Fox, Brian Coffey, James Mintert, Ted Schroeder, and Luc Valentin
Since the emergence of bovine spongiform encephalopa-
thy (BSE) in the United Kingdom in the late 1980s, the
United States has implemented various measures to pre-
vent the disease from entering the country, to prevent its
spread if discovered here, and to safeguard human health.
Regulatory actions included import restrictions, a ban on
certain ruminant tissues in ruminant feed, and a surveil-
lance program. Additional measures, aimed at reassuring
domestic and foreign consumers about the safety of US
beef, were implemented following the December 23, 2003
announcement that a dairy cow in Washington State had
tested positive for BSE. In the sections that follow, we dis-
cuss the US response to BSE under three broad catego-
ries—trade policy, food and feed restrictions, and
surveillance. Our analysis focuses on the costs associated
with various regulatory actions and less so on potential
benefits that are more difficult to quantify.
Trade Policy
Following the announcement of the first US case, 53
countries, including major markets such as Japan, Mexico,
South Korea, and Canada, banned imports of US cattle
and beef products. This came as no surprise—automatic
border closure following such announcements had become
standard procedure. The United States itself blocked
imports of Canadian beef and cattle following the
announcement of the first Canadian case in May 2003.
Border closure in response to a very low BSE incidence
in an exporting country is not endorsed by the World
Organization for Animal Health (OIE), particularly when
control measures are in place. Moreover, although the
United States itself had not adhered to OIE guidance on
trade, the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) did initiate regulations to allow imports from
countries, specifically Canada, that presented a “minimal
risk” of introducing BSE. This minimal risk region (MRR)
rule that would reopen the border to imports of Canadian
cattle less than 30 months old was to become effective
March 7, 2005. However, in response to a motion filed by
the Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund (R-CALF), a
federal court in Montana granted a preliminary injunction
blocking the measure. A hearing to determine whether a
permanent injunction should be granted is scheduled for
July 27, 2005.
The controversy surrounding the reopening of the
Canadian border illustrates the potential gains and losses
from any change in trade policy. Although R-CALF may
indeed be concerned about the human health risk from
Canadian cattle (though some might doubt it), it is clear
that US cattle producers, particularly those in the north-
western US, would lose from import competition in the
short run. Marsh, Brester, and Smith (2005) estimate that
Canadian imports would reduce US feeder cattle prices by
$4.57/cwt. However, in the long run, if adequate cattle
supplies are not available locally to keep US packing plants
in the region open, producers in the Northwest will lose
local cattle markets. Similarly, US producers are losing
from the current restrictions on US exports. In 2003, beef
exports were valued at $3.95 billion and accounted for
9.6% of US commercial production. Although some
important markets, including Mexico and Canada, did
partially reopen during 2004, exports for the year were
82% below 2003. Coffey, Mintert, Fox, Schroeder, and
Valentin (2005), in an analysis performed for the Kansas
Department of Agriculture, suggest that US beef industry
losses from export restrictions during 2004 ranged from
$3.2 billion to $4.7 billion.
The question we might ask here is whether these trade
disruptions and associated welfare losses could have been
avoided. Caswell and Sparling (in press) emphasize the
importance of an internationally coordinated response to
managing risks from diseases such as BSE, and Caswell (in
press) argues that the potential trade impacts of BSE dis-
covery were not sufficiently weighted in the BSE risk man-
agement process. Thus, if MRR legislation had been
enacted prior to the recent discoveries of BSE outside of104 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2)
Europe, we may never have banned
imports of Japanese beef when they
discovered their first case in Septem-
ber 2001, nor vice versa. Of course,
with the benefit of hindsight, it is
easy to point out what might have
been. Nevertheless, both Canada and
the United States had been warned
by the European Union in July 2000
that they were at risk for discovering
the disease (Scientific Steering Com-
mittee, 2000).
Surveillance
In 2003, the USDA tested approxi-
mately 20,000 cattle for BSE. Coun-
tries in which the disease is
established have more intensive sur-
veillance—for example, the EU has
tested around 8 million head per year
since 2001 (Fox & Peterson, 2004).
Following the Washington State case,
the USDA announced a one-year
enhanced surveillance program. The
objective was to test as many cattle as
possible from high-risk categories—
those exhibiting signs of central ner-
vous system disorders, nonambula-
tory cattle, and those that die on
farms—in addition to a random sam-
ple of healthy older animals. In vari-
ous news releases, the USDA stated
that a sample size of 268,000 animals
would allow for the detection of BSE
at a rate of one positive in 10 million
adult cattle with a 99% confidence
level. That claim, however, is based
on the assumption that all cases
occur in the targeted high-risk group
and that the incidence in nontargeted
categories is zero. As of April 2005,
314,000 cattle had been tested under
the new protocol with no positive
cases identified. Table 1 provides an
excerpt from the test results.
The surveillance program has
been a source of controversy in areas
related to testing protocol, ann-
ouncement of inconclusive results,
and an incident in Texas in May
2004 in which an animal exhibiting
central nervous system symptoms
was not tested for the disease. Incon-
clusive (or false positive) test results
are expected with the Bio-Rad rapid
screening test used by USDA. The
false positive rate is variously esti-
mated at between one in 50,000 to as
little as one in 300,000 tests. Thus
far, the USDA has announced three
inconclusive results—two in June
2004 and one in November 2004—
all of which, upon confirmatory test-
ing using immunohistochemistry
(IHC), were found to be negative.
The initial announcements of incon-
clusive cases were controversial and
led the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) to revise
their announcement procedure—
delaying announcement until a sam-
ple produced two inconclusive results
with the rapid test. Concern about
potential market disruption due to
false positives is one reason cited by
opponents of wider scale or voluntary
testing. For example, following the
announcement of the third inconclu-
sive test result on the morning of
November 18, 2004, most live cattle
futures contracts opened around $2/
cwt lower than the previous day’s
close, and many moved limit down
that day. Very light sales in the cash
market in the following days were
likely the short-run cash market reac-
tion to the news.
At the same time, there has been
speculation that the USDA deliber-
ately chose a test with a relatively
high rate of inconclusive results as a
means of desensitizing markets to the
possible discovery of true positive
cases (Mitchell, 2004). Also contro-
versial is the USDA’s choice of IHC
as their “gold standard” test. In Feb-
ruary 2005, Consumers Union called
on the USDA to retest inconclusive
samples using the Western Blot test,
which, they argued, was more sensi-
tive and more objective. According to
the Consumers Union, the Western
Blot test is used as the confirmatory
test in Japan and Europe and had
been used previously by the USDA
to confirm the December 2003
Washington State case. (See Pruis-
ner, 2004, for more information on
BSE testing.)
The future of the surveillance
program has not yet been decided.
Industry officials have called for it to
be scaled back. Not surprisingly,
some consumer advocacy groups
favor wider scale testing. For exam-
ple, a March 16, 2005 editorial in
The New York Times proposed that
“the only responsible way to resume
international trade in beef is to
ensure the health of the cattle. And
the only way to do that is to test the
cattle—all of them, if need be.”
In what turned out to be a partic-
ularly thorny issue for the USDA, in
July 2004 the agency denied an
application by a small Kansas beef
processor, Creekstone Farms, for per-
mission to voluntarily test slaughter
cattle in an attempt to regain access
to the Japanese export market. The
beef industry is sharply divided on
the issue of voluntary testing. Propo-
nents tend to view it in terms of a
marketing decision with expected
benefits outweighing costs, at least in
the short run. Indeed, our analysis
for the Kansas Department of Agri-
culture (Coffey et al., 2005) suggests
a potential net benefit ranging from
$27.50 to $48.50 per head (before
fixed costs) if voluntary testing
restored full access to the Japanese
and South Korean markets. Oppo-
nents argue that BSE testing is
unnecessary and costly, that it sets a
dangerous precedent in terms of
acquiescing to an unreasonable cus-
tomer demand, and that it is not sci-
entifically valid and provides no risk-2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2) CHOICES 105
reduction benefit to consumers.
Large US meat processor stances
regarding BSE testing suggest that
the investments and logistics of large-
scale testing, in addition to the
potential impact on demand of a pos-
itive case, are such that it is a losing
proposition for bigger firms—per-
haps in particular for those diversi-
fied either internationally or across
meat products. For a single small
firm, on the other hand—especially
one more heavily reliant on export
sales to high-quality foreign markets
than the major packers—the situa-
tion is different. If voluntary testing
provided export market access, it
could produce substantial monopoly-
type benefits in the short run. Creek-
stone officials have stated that their
increased revenue from regaining
access to the Japanese market would
far exceed the testing cost of $20 or
less per head. Thus, for Creekstone,
the private incentive to pursue testing
was fairly clear. It is worth noting
however, that this scenario would
produce no benefit for producers,
because increased demand from a
single small firm would have a negli-
gible impact on cattle prices. How-
ever, if testing did provide market
access, more firms would be attracted
to testing, and domestic cattle prices
would increase.
Finally, regarding the current sur-
veillance effort, it is not yet clear how
successful the USDA has been in its
efforts to sample the targeted high-
risk groups. The APHIS website pro-
vides no breakdown of samples by
animal categories (Table 1), in con-
trast to the UK, where detailed
breakdowns for various risk catego-
ries in the active surveillance pro-
grams are provided (Table 2). Clearly,
no one associated with the US beef
industry wants to find this disease.
However, the perception that officials
may have latitude in terms of sample
selection, rumors about animals not
sampled, and allegations by at least
one former USDA employee about
the mishandling of potentially posi-
tive test samples, does not help
engender confidence among foreign
buyers or policy decision makers.
Critics have commented that Ger-
many did not begin to find BSE until
it allowed private testing. If the dis-
ease is truly not present in the US
herd, then the industry has little to
fear from allowing expanded private
testing. However, what are the odds
that the surveillance program in place
during 2003 managed to detect the
only BSE-infected cow in a herd of
100 million?
Food and Feed Restrictions
In January 2004, the Food Safety
Inspection Service (FSIS) banned
nonambulatory animals and certain
tissues designated as specified risk
material (SRM) from the human
food supply. The new regulations
require firms to age animals using
postmortem dentition, to deal with
nonambulatory animals, and to seg-
regate SRM material. Using data
from a survey of meat processors,
Coffey et al. (2005) estimated the
 






9,138 0 — 0 9,138
Week 44
(3/28/05–4/3/05)
10,663 0 — 0 10,663
Week 25
(11/15/04–11/21/04)
7,900 1 Negative 0 7,901
Note. Data from USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (2005).
Table 2. Excerpts from the UK BSE test results report—2005.







Fallen stock 18,574 3 18,558 13
Casualties on farm 30,825 11 30,788 26
Casualties at OTMS abattoirs 3,165 0 3,164 1
24–30 month casualty cattle at fresh 
meat abattoirs 
211 0 211 0
Over thirty months (OTM) scheme—
random animals (born before August 
1996) (before feed ban)
2420 0 2417 3
OTM scheme—animals born after July 
1997
28,613 0 28,613 0
Animals sampled as 96/97 cohort 
(excluding fallen stock, casualties, etc.)
26,726 0 26,726 0
Birth cohorts of BSE cases 380 0 380 0
BSE offspring 43 0 43 0
Animals slaughtered for human 
consumption: OTM (beef assurance 
scheme)
22 0 22 0
Note. Data from Defra UK (2005).106 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2)
additional labor costs of these tasks at
approximately $0.45 per head of
plant capacity.
As currently defined, SRM
includes the brain, skull, eyes,
trigeminal ganglia, dorsal root gan-
glia, spinal cord, and vertebral col-
umn from cattle 30 months of age
and older, and the tonsils and the dis-
tal ileum of all cattle. In order to
ensure complete removal of the distal
ileum, the rules required that the
entire small intestine be disposed of
as inedible. The small intestine rule
has been the most controversial
aspect of the SRM regulation because
for some firms it was a valuable by-
product, particularly in some export
markets. Coffey et al. (2005) esti-
mated that on average, firms that
previously sold small intestines were
losing from $3.23 to $4.13 per head
because of the rule. Other products
condemned as a result of BSE regula-
tions include bone-in cuts from over-
thirty-month (OTM) animals that
contain vertebral column (i.e., T-
bone steaks) and product obtained
from advanced meat recovery (AMR)
using OTM vertebral columns. Cof-
fey et al. (2005) estimated that
restrictions on bone-in cuts and
AMR reduce per-head revenues by
approximately $8.50 and $9.36,
respectively, on affected OTM ani-
mals, while the ban on nonambula-
tory (downer) cattle resulted in an
aggregate loss of approximately $63
million.
On February 2, 2004, a panel of
experts (the International Review
Team or IRT) commissioned by the
USDA provided recommendations
for future actions for managing BSE
risk. With regard to feed regulations,
the IRT recommended that (a) unless
aggressive surveillance showed BSE
risk to be minimal, SRM should
include the brains and spinal cords of
all animals over 12 months and the
entire intestine of all animals; (b)
SRM should be excluded from all
animal feed including pet food; and
(c) all meat and bone meal (MBM),
including avian, be excluded from
ruminant feed. Earlier, on January
26, the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) announced plans to
strengthen the ruminant feed ban
that had been in place since 1997. In
particular, the FDA said it would
eliminate exemptions for bovine
blood and plate waste and ban the
feeding of poultry litter. In July
2004, the FDA published an
Advance Notice of Proposed Rule-
making (ANPR) with an invitation
to comment on several aspects of the
ruminant feed ban, including the rec-
ommendations of the IRT. The com-
ment period for this notice ended on
September 13, 2004, but as of April
2005, the FDA had not implemented
any of its proposed actions, and the
exemptions for plate waste and
bovine blood products in the 1997
feed ban remained in place.
Additional restrictions on SRM
or ruminant feed would hurt the cat-
tle sector by eliminating markets for
certain products or increasing feed
costs. Ruminant blood meal, for
example, is widely used in cattle feed,
particularly for dairy cows and in
milk replacement rations for calves.
When FDA announced plans to
eliminate the blood exemption, the
values of ruminant and porcine
blood meal, which had been similar,
diverged. During 2004, ruminant
blood meal traded at an average dis-
count of $250 per ton compared to
the porcine product. Coffey et al.
(2005) estimated that if the blood
exemption were eliminated, the value
of ruminant blood meal would fall by
an additional $225 per ton, resulting
in a combined loss of approximately
$1.43 for an average steer. Similarly,
the cost of banning currently defined
SRM from all animal feed was esti-
mated at $2.16 per head, and if the
SRM definition were extended (as
recommended by the IRT), the cost
would be $6.77 per head.
If additional cases of BSE are
found in the United States, it seems
likely that some of the changes pro-
posed by the FDA will become law.
The benefits of implementing those
measures are more difficult to quan-
tify than their costs. The Harvard/
Tuskegee risk analysis (Cohen et al.,
2001) estimated that a ban on SRM
in both human and animal feed
would reduce the predicted number
of BSE cases (in the event it is
present) by 80% and the potential
human exposure by 95%. However ,
the baseline level of exposure is so
low that further reductions appear to
have minimal value. As testing tech-
nologies develop and testing costs
fall, it may be more efficient to test
animals for the disease instead of
condemning their products. Testing,
even at current prices, appears prefer-
able to a total ban on feeding any
ruminant derived proteins to ani-
mals—a measure currently in place
in the EU and Japan. Coffey et al.
(2005) estimated the cost of such a
ban at $14.00 per head in lost reve-
nue plus $4.50 per head in additional
feed costs. However, for reasons that
are not clear to us, the testing option
is not currently applied to nonambu-
latory animals—even in cases in
which an animal sustains an injury in
transport.
Conclusions
Although the US response to BSE
can be critiqued in some areas, the
overall response appears to be far
more efficient than, for example, that
of Japan, which removed all cattle
over 30 months from the food chain,
instituted universal BSE testing, and
banned meat and bone meal for all2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2) CHOICES 107
uses. US policy makers appear to
have considered the costs and bene-
fits of various approaches and recog-
nized that the risk to human health is
extremely low.
How low is the risk? In the
United Kingdom, the human version
of BSE has claimed around 150 vic-
tims. However, they have had more
than 180,000 BSE infected cows,
most of which were found before the
connection to human disease was rec-
ognized. Estimates of the total num-
ber of animals infected in the United
Kingdom run to as high as two mil-
lion. Had Canadian and US authori-
ties taken no precautions to eliminate
SRM tissues from food, four Cana-
dian BSE cases might have led to
0.004 human cases in the next 10–15
years. The human health risk from
BSE is probably far lower than the
risk of choking on a toothbrush.
Thus, to suggest, as did Judge Rich-
ard Cebull in granting the injunction
blocking imports of Canadian cattle,
that BSE poses a “genuine risk of
death for US customers” is a com-
plete distortion of the concept of
what is really risky.
Beef, like any other food, is not
and never can be 100% risk free.
However, today’s salient risk is not
mad cow disease. Instead, it is the
more familiar bacterial pathogens like
Salmonella and E. coli, the incidences
of which have dropped significantly
in recent years. By refusing to imple-
ment drastic measures in response to
a virtually nonexistent threat, policy
makers may foster a more rational
perception of the risk associated with
the disease. Not permitting voluntary
testing of young animals, because it
provides no useful information for
consumers, could well be viewed as
part of that strategy. The wider
impact of such a measured response
may be one of enhancing the overall
stability of food demand and making
it less responsive to food scares that
occur from time to time.
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